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Background: Complex intervention trials may require health care organisations to implement new service models.
In a recent cluster randomised controlled trial, some participating organisations achieved high recruitment, whereas
others found it difficult to assimilate the intervention and were low recruiters. We sought to explain this variation
and develop a model to inform organisational participation in future complex intervention trials.
Methods: The trial included 40 general practices in a London borough with high HIV prevalence. The intervention
was offering a rapid HIV test as part of the New Patient Health Check. The primary outcome was mean CD4 cell
count at diagnosis. The process evaluation consisted of several hundred hours of ethnographic observation, 21
semi-structured interviews and analysis of routine documents (e.g., patient leaflets, clinical protocols) and trial
documents (e.g., inclusion criteria, recruitment statistics). Qualitative data were analysed thematically using—and,
where necessary, extending—Greenhalgh et al.’s model of diffusion of innovations. Narrative synthesis was used
to prepare case studies of four practices representing maximum variety in clinicians’ interest in HIV (assessed by
level of serological testing prior to the trial) and performance in the trial (high vs. low recruiters).
Results: High-recruiting practices were, in general though not invariably, also innovative practices. They were
characterised by strong leadership, good managerial relations, readiness for change, a culture of staff training and
available staff time (‘slack resources’). Their front-line staff believed that patients might benefit from the rapid HIV
test (‘relative advantage’), were emotionally comfortable administering it (‘compatibility’), skilled in performing it
(‘task issues’) and made creative adaptations to embed the test in local working practices (‘reinvention’). Early
experience of a positive HIV test (‘observability’) appeared to reinforce staff commitment to recruiting more
participants. Low-performing practices typically had less good managerial relations, significant resource constraints,
staff discomfort with the test and no positive results early in the trial.
Conclusions: An adaptation of the diffusion of innovations model was an effective analytical tool for retrospectively
explaining high and low-performing practices in a complex intervention research trial. Whether the model will work
prospectively to predict performance (and hence shape the design of future trials) is unknown.
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Introduction
A complex intervention is defined by the Medical Re-
search Council (MRC) as comprising multiple elements,
all of which seem essential but whose ‘active ingredient’
may be difficult to specify; they typically operate at mul-
tiple levels (individual, team, organisation) [1–3]. Such
interventions include new tests and treatments that cre-
ate opportunities for changing how services are delivered
(e.g., near-patient testing that potentially allows diagno-
ses to be made in primary care that were previously pos-
sible only in secondary care).
Much health services research consists of developing
complex interventions and testing them in randomised
controlled trials (RCTs). The MRC framework proposes
five phases (0 to 4), including developmental and pilot
work, the trial itself and an evaluation of post-trial im-
plementation in the ‘real world’ [4]. Complex interven-
tion trials generally require a cluster design (in which
the organisation or service team is the unit of random-
isation) and are studied through a pragmatic lens (i.e.,
seeking to replicate usual care as delivered by the staff
and through systems in participating organisations) ra-
ther than an explanatory one (i.e., seeking to produce
abstracted theoretical models of efficacy with an em-
phasis on scientific purity) [5, 6].
A growing theoretical and methodological literature
addresses the question whether interventions that are
complex can legitimately be tested using experimental
designs in which they are conceptualised as a clearly de-
fined set of inputs implemented in a controlled way with
attention to mediating and moderating variables [4, 7, 8]
or whether their complexity requires a more ecological
conceptualisation as ‘events in systems’ and (therefore)
developmental rather than experimental research de-
signs [9–12]. Either way, a key focus of study is the
interaction between the complex intervention and the
local settings in which it is implemented [3, 13, 14].
An important concept is the idea of a theoretical ‘hard
core’ of a complex intervention (elements that cannot be
compromised without invalidating the trial) and a flexible
‘soft periphery’ (elements of the intervention that can and
should be adapted locally to optimise acceptance and em-
bedding) [15, 16]. In any complex intervention trial, each
unit (e.g., participating organisation or team) will imple-
ment the intervention differently, so a component of trial
quality is ensuring fidelity of the theoretical core [2, 15].
The emerging science of process evaluation uses qualita-
tive research alongside a RCT to capture the experiences
of staff and patients, illuminate tasks and processes, ex-
plore model–reality gaps and develop and test theory [17,
18]. Such approaches can be used both retrospectively (to
explain successes and failures) and prospectively (to in-
form further refinement of the intervention). Specifictheoretical lenses applied in this context include normal-
isation process theory [19] and realist evaluation [20],
though the latter has been contested [21].
One approach that has not previously been used to study
the process of implementing a complex intervention in a
RCT is diffusion of innovations theory. Originally devel-
oped by Everett Rogers in the 1950s to explain the adop-
tion and spread of innovations by individuals in a social
network [22], the theory was later extended by Greenhalgh
et al. to address the assimilation and implementation of
service-level innovations in health care organisations [23].
Greenhalgh et al.’s definition of an innovation as “a novel
set of behaviors, routines, and ways of working that are di-
rected at improving health outcomes, administrative effi-
ciency, cost effectiveness, or users’ experience and that are
implemented by planned and coordinated actions” ([23], p.
582) agrees strongly with the MRC definition of a complex
intervention (paragraph 1). It follows that the multi-level
model developed by Greenhalgh et al. to study the adop-
tion (and non-adoption and abandonment) of innovations
may also prove useful for explaining variation in imple-
mentation success in complex intervention trials.
In this article, we apply Greenhalgh et al.’s model to a
retrospective process evaluation of a complex interven-
tion to introduce rapid HIV testing in a general practice
setting. Below we summarise the trial and introduce the
diffusion of innovations model and then describe our
methodology, findings and conclusions. In the Discus-
sion section, we offer preliminary suggestions for using
the diffusion of innovations model prospectively to opti-
mise organisational participation in trials.
The trial of rapid HIV testing in general practice
A summary of the rationale, methodology and findings
of this trial have been published elsewhere [24, 25].
Briefly, general practice–based screening for HIV is ap-
pealing, given the rising prevalence of the condition in
the United Kingdom (especially London), a good prog-
nosis if treated early, the high proportion of cases (24 %)
that remain undiagnosed in the community and the high
proportion (47 %) of patients diagnosed with advanced
disease [26]. The British HIV Association and the Na-
tional Institute for Health and Care Excellence both sup-
port community-based testing in areas where the
prevalence of diagnosed HIV is above 2 per 1000 adult
population [27, 28], but such testing has not previously
been evaluated experimentally in real-world conditions.
Rapid (near-patient) testing provides an accessible
means of testing large numbers of people in non-specialist
settings. We used the INSTI™ HIV-1/HIV-2 Rapid
Antibody Test (bioLytical Laboratories, Richmond, BC,
Canada), which is quick to learn and easy to use and thus
potentially able to be used by staff with minimal training
(see Box 1). The INSTI test has a high sensitivity of
Box 1 The intervention: rapid HIV testing in general practice
The ‘hard core’ of the intervention [16] was the INSTI HIV-1/HIV-2 Rapid
Antibody Test (bioLytical Laboratories, Richmond, BC, Canada). The
single-use test involves 50 μl of finger-prick blood, which was mixed
with a sample diluent and poured onto a membrane unit, followed by a
drop of developer and clarifying solution. After about 1 min, either one
or two blue dots would appear, indicating one of four possible results:
non-reactive (one blue dot, negative), reactive (two blue dots, suggesting
the presence of HIV antibody in patient serum), indeterminate (e.g., two
faint dots or two dots with one displaying a pale centre, suggesting
possible early infection) or invalid (none of the above, suggesting test
performed wrongly or a faulty test kit). A reactive or indeterminate INSTI
test is not definitive; it requires confirmation with a serological test. The
test is 99.6 % sensitive and 99.3 % specific [30]. The ‘soft periphery’ of the
intervention was how this test was introduced and how it became
embedded in the New Patient Health Check and wider organisational
routines. As per trial protocol, each practice received a 90-min training
session delivered by the research team and a consultant or specialist HIV
doctor or nurse, comprising theoretical elements (rationale) and practical
ones (rehearsing pre-test and post-test explanations, if possible with a
simulated patient, and performing the test on samples under supervision).
The practice lead for rapid HIV testing [nurse or health care assistant
(HCA)] received an additional training session on study algorithms and
quality assurance procedures. Quality control procedures were offered
monthly for the first year of the trial and every 3 months in the second.
Dedicated codes were installed on practice computers to capture rapid
HIV testing as part of the New Patient Health Check or other consultations.
Practices received a small one-off payment (£300) plus £10 per test
performed, plus free testing kits and support. The New Patient Health
Check is used mainly to collect baseline data on health and lifestyle
from new registrants by asking standard questions led by computerised
prompts. Raising the possibility of HIV to a new patient in a short,
largely administrative appointment alters the nature of this appointment.
Pre-test counselling is not provided, and there is no preliminary assessment
of risk. Staff are encouraged to use standard phrases when explaining the
test (and offering the opportunity to opt out), delivering it and giving
provisional results. In the case of a ‘reactive’, ‘indeterminate’ or ‘twice invalid’
result, for example, staff were told to ask the patient to wait in the waiting
or consultation room until the general practitioner was available to discuss
the result with them and arrange confirmatory serology.
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United Kingdom, this means that only 1 per 125,000 test
results can be expected to be false non-reactive. Owing to
the 3-month diagnostic window period, the test may fail
to detect HIV in the early, acute phase of infection [29].
Patients with a non-reactive result with no recent risk can
be assured of their negative HIV status immediately,
whereas those with ‘reactive’ or ‘indeterminate’ results re-
quire confirmatory serological testing [30]. Potentially,
then, HIV testing (serology or rapid or both) could be in-
corporated into the New Patient Health Checks that are
currently routine in UK general practice [31].
The trial ran for 28 months between 2010 and 2012.
Recruitment took place at 40 of 45 general practises
practices in a socioeconomically disadvantaged London
borough where the baseline prevalence of diagnosed
HIV was 8 per 1000 adult population. Practices were
randomised to an intervention arm (implementing rapid
HIV testing alongside New Patient Health Checks) or acontrol arm (usual care). The intervention is described
in Box 1.
The primary outcome was timeliness of diagnosis on
the basis of mean CD4 cell count of all patients newly
diagnosed as HIV-positive in general practice, an indica-
tor of stage of diagnosis. Overall, intervention practices
offered 11,180 rapid tests, and 44.5 % of these were ac-
cepted. In total, 14 tests were reactive, of which 11 were
confirmed to be HIV-positive. Serological testing [e.g.,
opportunistically by general practitioners (GPs) during
routine consultations, and through antenatal screening]
identified 21 (intervention) and 14 (control) further
cases of HIV. Patients identified in intervention practices
had higher CD4 counts (that is, were at an earlier stage
of infection) than those identified in control practices
[24, 25]. Of the patients diagnosed, 79 % were part of
identified risk groups (63 % black African origin, 16 %
men who have sex with men). All patients identified via
rapid testing were successfully transferred to secondary
care, and an economic evaluation showed that the inter-
vention is likely to be cost-effective (unpublished data).
Despite the overall success of the trial and the positive
result, there was marked variation between the 20 inter-
vention practices in how many tests were offered and, of
these, how many were accepted (see the Results section).
This raised important questions and provided the im-
petus for a retrospective process evaluation of why some,
but not all, practices were able to assimilate and sustain-
ably implement rapid HIV testing as part of the New Pa-
tient Health Check, even though all had agreed to
participate in the trial and knew that a goal of the trial
was to increase testing.
The diffusion of innovations model
A wide-ranging systematic review of the diffusion, spread
and sustainability of innovations in the organisation and
delivery of health services identified six interacting com-
ponents: (1) the innovation itself; (2) the intended
adopters; (3) communication and influence; (4) the inner
organisational or system context, comprising general ante-
cedents for innovation-specific readiness for a particular
innovation; (5) the outer (inter-organisational and envir-
onmental) context; and (6) the implementation process.
The model (Fig. 1) emphasises the importance of linkage
between different components of and feedback regarding
the consequences of innovation to other parts of the sys-
tem. The components of the model are defined in Table 1.
Applying this model to a RCT design is not straightfor-
ward, because the evidence on which it is based relates to
free-living individuals operating in real-world conditions.
In particular, the element relating to communication and
influence was less relevant to this evaluation, because all
practices and participating staff received a standardised
training package (Box 1). Nevertheless, the pragmatic
Fig. 1 Greenhalgh et al.’s diffusion of innovation model [23]. Figure taken from article by TG in Milbank Quarterly 2004; 82:595. Reproduced under
author’s original copyright transfer agreement
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were built into the study design. For example, participat-
ing practices were open to communication from other
practices locally as well as from other, ‘outer context’ influ-
ences, such as the economic recession, new immigration
and changes in national and local HIV policies.
The aspects of the model that were most relevant to
the process evaluation were staff perceptions about the
intervention (testing was undertaken by practice staff,
who had different views about the value and appropri-
ateness of the test and their own role in it), the organisa-
tional antecedents and readiness for innovation as well
as the implementation and assimilation process.Methods
Management and governance
Full details of study management and governance, in-
cluding the independent data monitoring committee, are
given in the main empirical report [24, 25]. The trial(ISRCTN63473710) was approved by Camden and Is-
lington Community Research Ethics Committee (09/
H0722/67). Ethical approval for the qualitative research
was gained from Bloomsbury National Research Ethics
Service committee (11/LO/0324) in April 2011 with an
amendment in December 2013.Data sources for process evaluation
Various methodologies and data sources were used.Participant observation
Throughout the trial period, HM was a member of the
study team responsible for practice recruitment, train-
ing, monitoring and general liaison. This work required
her to make frequent visits to practices, which were
typed up formally as field notes as soon as was practic-
able after each visit. Numerous informal conversations
and email exchanges also took place with practice staff
regarding all aspects of implementation, including the
Table 1 Definitions of components of Greenhalgh et al.’s diffusion of innovations model
Component Definition
Attributes of the innovation How the potential adopter views the pros and cons of the innovation
Relative advantage A clear, unambiguous advantage in terms of either effectiveness
or cost effectiveness.
Compatibility Compatible with the values, norms and perceived needs or
intended adopters.
Low complexity Composed of simple, easy to implement steps; able to be broken
down and learned on an incremental basis.
Trialability Can be experimented with.
Observability Benefits are (or quickly become) visible to intended adopters.
Potential for reinvention Possibility to adapt, refine or otherwise modify the innovation to
suit adopter needs.
Fuzzy boundaries If innovations have ‘hard cores’ (irreducible elements of the
innovation) and ‘soft peripheries’ (structures and systems required
for full implementation), adaptation of the soft periphery can
facilitate adoption.
Risk Risks of the innovation (as perceived by the intended adopter) are
outweighed by its perceived benefits.
Task issues Extent to which the innovation is relevant, feasible, workable and
easy to use for the adopter.
Nature of knowledge Knowledge required to enact the innovation can be transferred,
either by codification (explicit knowledge) or more informally, e.g.,
by shadowing (tacit knowledge).
Technical support If the innovation is technical, help desk support is available,
especially in the early stages of implementation.
System antecedents for innovation (including
structure and/or absorptive capacity and/or
receptive context)
Extent to which the organisation is ready for innovations in general
Structure Size and/or maturity Practice size is related to innovation adoption, with larger
practices faring better regarding implementation; a proxy for other
features, e.g., slack resources and functional differentiation.
Formalisation The extent to which there are rules and protocols regarding
organisational activities which are upheld.
Differentiation The extent to which roles and activities are divided.
Decentralisation Decision-making power is appropriately dispersed across
organisations.
Slack resources The resources an organisation has beyond what it minimally
requires to maintain operations.
Absorptive capacity for new knowledge A dynamic capability pertaining to knowledge creation and use that enhances an organisation’s
ability to gain and sustain a competitive advantage.
Pre-existing knowledge and/or
skill set
Existing knowledge and skills within the organisation; particularly
facilitatory if somehow related to the innovation.
Ability to find, interpret,
recodify and integrate new
knowledge
The ability to take on, understand, integrate into existing systems
and put into productive use new information.
Enablement of knowledge
sharing via internal and
external networks
Individuals are able to share knowledge regarding the innovation
internally and externally through established networks.
Receptive context for change A combination of factors from both the inner and the outer contexts that together determine an
organisation’s ability to respond effectively and purposefully to change.
Leadership and vision Top management support, advocacy of the implementation
process and continued commitment to it enhance the success of
implementation and routinisation.
Good managerial relations Staff have positive relationships with managers.
Risk-taking climate
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Table 1 Definitions of components of Greenhalgh et al.’s diffusion of innovations model (Continued)
A supportive working culture where practice staff feel able to
experiment with new innovations without fear of being
reprimanded.
Clear goals and priorities Objectives are clear to the organisation and the staff.
High-quality data capture Organisational systems are in place to obtain high-quality data re-
lated to the innovation diffusion.
System readiness for innovation The extent to which the organisation is ready for the specific innovation.
Tension for change Degree to which adopters see the current situation as inadequate
or intolerable.
Innovation system fit The innovation fits with existing values, norms, strategies, goals,
skill mix, supporting technologies and ways of working within the
organisation.
Power balances
Assessment of implications The implications of adoption are known and assessed.
Dedicate time and/or resources Degree to which budget and resources available are adequate
and recurrent.
Monitoring and feedback Systems and skills are in place to monitor and evaluate the impact
of the innovation and feedback to adopters.
Adopter Those meant to adopt and enact innovations.
Needs What the adopter needs to be able to adopt the innovation.
Motivation Whether the adopter is motivated to adopt the innovation.
Values and goals Does the innovation gel with the adopter’s values and goals?
Skills The skills required to adopt the innovation and whether adopters
possess these.
Learning style The ways that adopters learn are considered and catered to in the
innovation training.
Social networks The patterns of friendship, advice, communication and support
that exist among members of a social system.
Implementation process The process by which a new innovation is diffused across an organisation.
Decision making devolved to
front-line teams
Do lead users of the innovation have control over aspects of the
implementation process?
Hands-on approach by leaders
and managers
Leaders and managers are involved in the implementation
process, supporting and assisting problem solving as required.
Human resources issues,
especially training
Have all human resources issues linked to the introduction of the
innovation (training, workload, supervision, performance
management) been addressed adequately?
Dedicated resources Specific resources of time, budget and other relevant resource are
dedicated to support implementation.
Internal communication Involved bodies communicate effectively with each other
regarding the innovation and the implementation process.
External collaboration Effective knowledge-sharing links to other organisations who are
implementing the same innovation.
Reinvention and/or
development
Was it possible to adapt the innovation or the tasks and processes
associated with it to suit local contingencies?
Feedback on progress Are there evaluative and feedback mechanisms in place and
enacted?
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testing and their narratives of test enactment. This
‘autoethnographic’ approach is widely used in organi-
sational case study research and can provide a parti-
cularly rich account of organisational culture and
practices [32, 33].Qualitative interviews
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with a pur-
posive sample of 21 staff in 16 of the 20 intervention
practices; the other four practices failed to respond to
requests. Most were nurses (n = 11) or HCAs (n = 7)
who primarily offered the rapid HIV test as a part of the
McMullen et al. Trials  (2015) 16:242 Page 7 of 16New Patient Health Check. One practice manager, one
clinical manager and one GP were interviewed in relation
to their role in rapid testing (e.g., managing patients with
reactive or indeterminate rapid test results, overall coord-
ination of testing within the practice). Interviews were
conducted at the practice during normal working hours
and were one-to-one, except for two nurse and HCA pairs
who asked to be interviewed together. Written informed
consent was obtained from all participants, who also com-
pleted a short demographic survey regarding age, eth-
nicity, length of time at current practice, part-time or
full-time employment and previous HIV-related experi-
ence. Interviews lasted between 30 and 60 min. Interviews
were conducted throughout the final 8 months of the trial
and into the following year. Participants were given a £10
voucher as compensation for their time.
Proust et al., in a feasibility and acceptability pilot
study published prior to the trial, reported on patient
views regarding rapid HIV testing in general practice
[34]. Qualitative interviews with patients offered a rapid
test as a part of the New Patient Health Check found
that patients found the offer of a test acceptable and that
they found the reduced wait time for results and the ac-
cessibility of testing to be appealing. Concerns included
a possible lack of support for the newly diagnosed pa-
tient and patient preparation for testing [34]. Interviews
are currently being undertaken with consenting pa-
tients who were diagnosed as HIV-positive through the
trial and rapid testing. In a forthcoming article, we will
report on patient diagnostic experiences of rapid HIV
testing as part of the New Patient Health Check in pri-
mary care.
Trial performance at practice level
Practice-level performance data were collected through
the remotely accessible electronic record systems used
in participating practices (EMIS [35] and VISION [36]).
This allowed the research team to gather regular data on
the number of rapid HIV tests offered, performed and
declined at each practice. Upon completion of the trial,
data were aggregated and overall trial performance was
analysed. In addition, the number of HIV serological
tests per practice (i.e., tests sent to the hospital labora-
tory either to confirm a rapid test result or for other
clinical reasons) was compiled quarterly.
More generally, practice demographic data (including
practice list size, index of multiple deprivation score,
level of male serological HIV testing prior to the trial)
were collated to enrich the case study and inform the
application of the diffusion of innovations model.
Data analysis and case study construction
Data analysis occurred in two phases: (1) preliminary fa-
miliarisation and coding and (2) synthesis into casestudies. In the preliminary phase, qualitative transcripts
(field notes, interviews and extracts from emails and
documents) and matched demographic data on inter-
viewees were uploaded into NVivo software (QSR Inter-
national, Doncaster, Australia) and framework analysis
was undertaken [37]. Selected transcripts (sampled for
diversity and richness) were used to develop a prelimin-
ary coding frame. This framework was then applied to
all transcripts, with emerging themes noted. Coding re-
ports were generated. This process was applied twice.
The first time it was designed to organise and gain fa-
miliarity with the data using the question, What were
the experiences and perspectives of providers of rapid
HIV tests in primary care? The second time it was used
to bring in the components of the diffusion of
innovation model (Fig. 1) to consider the question, What
enabled or hindered providers in effectively implement-
ing rapid HIV testing in general practice? After produ-
cing preliminary categories, we iteratively refined these
in team discussions using the constant comparative
method—that is, comparing each new item of data with
an emerging picture of the case as a whole [38].
We created a spreadsheet of practice characteristics
that included practice size, male HIV testing rate prior
to the trial, rapid HIV and serological testing and
practice HIV diagnoses during the trial period. One
striking (and initially surprising) finding was that prac-
tices that had had high rates of male serological test-
ing for HIV before the trial (a proxy for the level of
prior awareness and interest in HIV in that practice)
were not always high performers in rapid testing. This
analysis informed the sampling of four contrasting
case studies to help theorise the findings using diffu-
sion of innovations:
 Practice A: high serological testing, high rapid testing
 Practice B: low serological testing, high rapid testing
 Practice C: low serological testing, low rapid testing
 Practice D: high serological testing, low rapid testing
Our aim in constructing the case studies was to pro-
duce a rich and meaningful account of how and to
what extent the rapid HIV testing intervention was as-
similated and implemented in each participating prac-
tice, all of whom showed enthusiasm for adopting the
intervention. We used team discussions and applied nar-
rative as a sense-making and synthesis tool to weave
together the quantitative and qualitative findings for that
practice into a rich picture that depicted key perspectives,
events and upstream causes while also conveying ambigu-
ities and uncertainties [39]. In this way, the strengths and
weaknesses of each practice for the purposes of imple-
menting the intervention were revealed and explored.
We sent drafts of our interpretation to practices who
McMullen et al. Trials  (2015) 16:242 Page 8 of 16were interested in seeing them before finalising the inter-
pretations presented below.
Results
Description of dataset and introduction to case examples
The final dataset for the process evaluation comprised
60 pages of field notes, 245 pages of interview tran-
scripts and 70 pages of additional free-text documenta-
tion, plus quantitative data on the distribution of 11,000
rapid HIV tests across 20 intervention practices and
5193 serological (hospital laboratory) tests across 40
intervention and control practices, respectively.
Common findings: relative advantage and simplicity of
the rapid test
Despite wide variation in uptake of rapid testing between
practices, there were some findings common to all, par-
ticularly in relation to the intervention (Box 1). The
front-line staff who delivered the intervention almost
universally perceived a distinct relative advantage (and
considered that patients also saw an advantage) in rapid,
accessible and convenient testing in general practice
compared with usual care (the serological test requiring
venepuncture and at least a 2-day wait for results). The
quick and actionable results would mean less waiting
and administration and, many staff believed, fewer losses
to follow-up. Staff reported that patients appreciated re-
ceiving their results instantly, and they themselves
gained satisfaction in being able to provide this informa-
tion quickly.
Staff and patients felt that placing the rapid HIV test
within the New Patient Health Check with an ‘opt-out’
option allowed people with low awareness of HIV and
low concerns about testing to access a test easily,
thereby extending the reach of testing.
Interviewer: Do you think it’s a good idea to test it in
that way?
HCA: Yes, 100 %.
Interviewer: How come?
HCA: Because most people don’t even think about it at
all. They could go on their whole lives not thinking
about it and people are quite—I don’t know if
‘ignorant’ is the right word to use. If you offer
somebody at a consultation on a one-on-one an HIV
test, they might get a bit offended. But this way, if
you’re saying it’s something that we’re doing at this
point in our practice, as a new patient joining us it’s
offered randomly, it just gives people a chance to think
about if they do want it. If they decline, then at least
they can come back and say, “You know, I was offered
this test, and yes, I would like to have it done.” – HCA
from practice DLack of need for pre-test and post-test counselling and
detailed sexual history testing, as well as location of the
test in the context of a routine general practice encoun-
ter, effectively normalised and destigmatised the rapid
HIV test and made it relatively easy for non-specialist
staff to learn and deliver (and for patients to accept).
However, HCAs in particular do not routinely test for
what is considered a stigmatised and serious condition,
so the test did require some change in their role and the
way they related to patients—an issue that played out
differently with different staff and in different practices
(see case studies below).
Staff also commented that patients preferred rapid
finger-prick testing to venous blood sampling. The test
was technically simple, and phlebotomy skills were not
needed. Even patients who disliked needles did not seem
to mind the small lancet used quickly in the rapid test, a
finding we demonstrated previously in a pilot study [35].
They also said that patients preferred the near-patient
test, as they could visibly see that the result was their
own, thereby increasing their trust in the test result.
In sum, the INSTI HIV-1/HIV-2 Rapid Antibody Test
(the ‘hard core’ of the intervention; see Box 1) was
perceived extremely positively by the staff charged with
delivering it. Below, we present four contrasting case
studies of practices where different individual and organ-
isational factors combined to produce four very different
contexts for assimilating, implementing and sustaining
the intervention for the duration of the trial.Practice A (high recruiter): high system antecedents, high
system readiness
Practice A implemented the rapid testing intervention
very successfully, offering more rapid tests than any
other practiceand having a moderate decline rate
(42 %), though only one case of HIV was detected via
the New Patient Health Check. Our qualitative and
quantitative data showed that effective implementation
of the test was the result of key system antecedents for
innovation, high system readiness for the rapid test and
a smooth implementation process and strong adopter
factors among front-line staff (see Fig. 1).
Practice A was one of the largest practices in the bor-
ough. It was mature and well organised, with a clear dif-
ferentiation of functions and staff roles and good
managerial relations. For example, the practice nurse and
HCA had been with the practice for some time. They
felt their roles were clear, and they understood who
should be called upon and at what stage if a test was re-
active. Both expressed the importance of GPs in making
diagnoses, both for the patient and for the sake of their
own comfort in offering tests. If needed, they sought in-
formation and clarification from senior staff.
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the test at the time I offered it, in the New Patient
Health Check, but is it okay if I go away, think about
it and then maybe come back? And I’ve said, Well, you
know, this is something that we offer now. If you come
back, then I’d have to question that with the doctor as
to whether you can have it as a, you know, fully
registered patient. I’ve spoken, I did speak to a doctor
actually, and they said that it would be okay if they
hadn’t been registered too far down the line. – HCA
from practice A
Junior practice staff were mentored by more senior
staff, providing both pastoral support and opportun-
ities for individual and team learning (the latter linked
to the key construct of absorptive capacity; see Table 1).
The practice was able to integrate new knowledge
through regular practice meetings and feedback. Prac-
tice A showed interest in the monitoring of progress
and the study’s overall performance, often asking how
they rated in relation to other trial practices.
Leadership, organisation and communication ap-
peared to be strong factors in practice A. For example, a
lead was assigned for the intervention and provided
support to junior staff tasked with delivery. Roles were
well differentiated, and support was provided promptly
when required.
Interviewer: But you’ve had a reactive?
Nurse: That was an early one.
HCA: Yeah.
Nurse: Trying to; I’m trying to recall it.
Interviewer: Okay.
Nurse: As to what, as to what I actually said. I remember
I sent a screen message to (GP A), and I, I think I just
said something like, oh, that I needed the doctor to verify
the result and that I needed him to look at it. I think it
was something like, that, it’s such a long time ago now,
and then (GP B) came in, and I had a chat with him,
and we did the blood test, gave him some information,
and I think (GP A) said that he would be in contact with
him. – Nurse and HCA from practice A
Staff in practice A perceived the intervention positively
and were also proud of the overall quality of service they of-
fered. They viewed the new test as enhancing that quality.
Nurse: Yeah, I think, the impression I get is that they
think that we’re been quite thorough and that we’re,
you know, so I think it, I think it promotes us.
HCA: That we’re very organised, well, she said I’m
very organised and thorough.
Nurse: Yeah, that we care and that we’re offering a
good service. – Nurse and HCA from practice APerhaps partly for this reason, rapid testing was
quickly incorporated into the New Patient Health Check
and was viewed by staff as a good fit with that process (a
construct described in the literature as ‘innovation–sys-
tem fit’ [23]). Practice A was also one of the few prac-
tices that did not stress time constraints (linking with
what in the model is called ‘slack resources’, defined in
Table 1).
Early in the trial, a positive HIV diagnosis through
rapid testing was made, demonstrating that the
innovation ‘worked’ and achieved its objective, an attri-
bute known as observability. This is likely to have rein-
forced the implementation process (see feedback arrows
in Fig. 1).
In sum, practice A illustrated many of the key organisa-
tional preconditions for successful assimilation of
innovation, including key elements of structure (large prac-
tice list size, maturity, slack resources, functional differenti-
ation), absorptive capacity for new knowledge (high pre-
existing knowledge and skills base and formal and informal
processes for knowledge sharing among staff from different
professional groups) and high readiness to change (leader-
ship and vision, good managerial relations, risk-taking cli-
mate and high-quality data capture). It also showed high
readiness for the particular innovation (innovation–system
fit) because clinicians were already interested in HIV testing
and keen to promote it further. Importantly, nobody in the
practice appeared opposed to the innovation.
Practice B (high recruiter): moderate system antecedents,
exceptional front-line staff, strong internal synergies
Practice B also assimilated rapid HIV testing very effect-
ively as part of the New Patient Health Check. Despite
being one of the small to medium-size practices and
having a low turnover of patients (and hence fewer new
registrants), this practice diagnosed twice as many pa-
tients through rapid HIV testing as any other practice in
the study. The number of rapid tests offered (n = 870)
was high for practice size, and the rate of tests declined
was low (36 %). Yet, the serological testing rate prior to
and throughout the trial was fairly low [fourth amongst
the 40 (0.66/1000 serological testing rate during the trial
period, and 2.07/1000 prior to the trial, respectively)
participating practices prior to the trial], suggesting that
the practice did not previously place significant emphasis
on HIV testing. A number of factors at both the organ-
isational and individual levels may help explain this
success.
Practice B demonstrated moderate system antecedents
and readiness for innovation (see Fig. 1). The practice
was well organised and had a clear and harmonious dif-
ferentiation of roles; the nurse spoke highly of senior doc-
tors and vice versa. The practice also had high absorptive
capacity for new knowledge and a receptive context for
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more also point to the practice’s goals and priorities of
supporting patients beyond immediate medical needs. On
one occasion when there was concern about misinter-
preted results, the nurse immediately discussed next steps
with the GP and ensured the safety of the patient. The
good managerial relationships and strong communication
shown here may also indicate a risk-taking climate in
which interacting with innovations is encouraged and so-
lutions to any challenges are found together when
needed.
Respondent: There was one which did … that was
indeterminate. There was … you know, the pots. It was
… it was supposed to be non-reactive, but inside that
pot it was like a line.
Interviewer: Okay. Right. Just a straight line.
Respondent: And when I told the doctor, he say,
probably … no, not the doctor; the lady that came the
other day. He said probably it is damaged or
something like that. But I told Doctor A, and he said I
should call the patient back, you know. So, we call the
patient back, and I explain, even to the patient as
well, that this result, it doesn’t mean you have HIV
now, but it might be one thing or the other that is
making the … you know, the test to being invalid. So
… and she decided … she came back.
Interviewer: Had another test.
Respondent: Yes. And it was non-reactive. – Nurse
from practice B
Although the practice had low serology rates prior to the
trial, once testing was introduced and the staff were trained,
the intervention was quickly adopted. Staff appeared en-
gaged, seeing the relative advantage of the innovation.
An unusual feature of practice B was that a single indi-
vidual (the practice nurse) undertook all New Patient
Health Checks, for which she had a generous time alloca-
tion (30 min for each). She worked full-time and had her
own dedicated consultation room. She had a professional
and strongly patient-centred approach to her job, working
largely autonomously and indicating general enjoyment of
what she did.
The nurse who did all the rapid testing framed it not
merely as a service for individual patients but also as an
ethical imperative and a way to improve public health; in
other words, it had particularly high value and significance
for her as a professional.
I think I just like doing it because it is good. When you
think about the end result, is good. It makes you feel
you have done something good as well. At least for
somebody who doesn’t know that is positive and is not,
because although the news of being positive, it has alot of effect on them, but after counselling…. But I
believe it will prevent other people as well, or protect
other people. Either prevent or protect from catching it
because if it is known, then the patient can take
precaution not to infect other people. – Nurse from
practice B
Quality control visits showed that the lead nurse for
rapid testing, along with other practice staff, managed to
‘reinvent’ the test and the algorithm to suit local practice
conditions without losing fidelity. The nurse felt con-
cerned at the potential effect of a reactive result on the pa-
tient in the room, so the nurse began to perform the
definitive aspect of the test away from the patient’s
view—an adaptation that was not in the original training.
She did not disclose to the patient that the test took
1 min, allowing herself a few moments when required to
reflect on test results and plan her next steps.
Interviewer: Yes. How did you feel the first time you
saw a reactive?
Nurse: I was … but I was looking, but he wasn’t
looking at me.
Interviewer: Yes, because you do it on that side of the
room.
Nurse: Yes. On that side. So he was sitting down there,
so … but he was looking at me as well. But because I
was facing that side, he couldn’t see my face. – Nurse
from practice B
Another adaptation in practice B was that GPs would
refer patients to this nurse for rapid testing, regardless
of whether they were booked for a new patient check.
The nurse reported that some patients for whom the
possibility of HIV infection was being considered were
persuaded to have the rapid test when they may have de-
clined the more invasive and less convenient serological
testing.
As in practice A, a positive HIV diagnosis through
rapid testing was made early in the trial, reinforcing staff
confidence in the test.
Practice B is noteworthy, not merely for possessing
many (though not all) key system antecedents and readi-
ness factors for innovation and highly motivated front-
line staff, but also in the way these elements were com-
bined. The very professional and patient-centred practice
nurse, for example, was able to give her very best to the
study because the practice allocated plenty of time and
allowed the nurse to work independently and adapt the
innovation to suit her own working style and local
microroutines. More subtly, the culture of the practice
was to embrace innovations and support their embed-
ding. Doctors recognised the nurse’s competence and
interest in this innovation and began to send her
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other ways, the elements of innovativeness built on
one another synergistically.Practice C (low recruiter): low system antecedents,
reluctant front-line staff
Practice C struggled to implement rapid testing. The
practice was slow to offer the first test, and its rate of
testing remained low throughout the study (in total, 72
rapid tests were offered, and 50 % of these were de-
clined), despite multiple visits and ‘retraining’ from the
research team. It had a low serology HIV testing rate
prior to and throughout the trial. Low recruitment from
this practice was explained by a combination of factors,
both organisational and individual.
System antecedents were low in practice C. A small
practice, it comprised three GPs, one nurse and one
HCA (both of whom undertook New Patient Health
Checks), one practice manager and two receptionists.
Located within a large building housing multiple prac-
tices, the surgery; always seemed crowded and very busy.
The practice showed little interest in, or time to ac-
commodate, other innovations, and there were few re-
sources (human or financial) available to invest in new
projects. Overall, the practice appeared to find a new
service model difficult to integrate into business as
usual. There was expressed frustration with changing
National Health Service (NHS) policy and guidance as
well as broader changes in health care culture. A low ab-
sorptive capacity for new knowledge was also evident.
One of the doctors, for example, asked the research
team how to access information and register for GP
training courses unrelated to the intervention, suggest-
ing that this individual found locating and navigating in-
formation difficult. Significantly, practice staff did not
perceive a great need for HIV testing in the borough,
suggesting that there was little, if any, tension for
change. The nurse described herself as ‘overstretched’.
She gave the impression of barely being able to complete
her existing work and having almost no personal cap-
acity for additional tasks:
[The rapid HIV test] really is not a problem. It’s just,
you know, having the time. I mean, often I get to the
end of a morning, and I feel like a rag. – Nurse,
practice C
Because of the understandable reluctance of busy
front-line staff to accommodate the test, it never became
routinised within the New Patient Health Check in prac-
tice C; it was not offered to most patients having these
checks, and, unlike in practices A and B, it never came
to be viewed by staff as part of that check. With suchlow numbers of tests being undertaken, it was not sur-
prising that no cases of HIV were detected using rapid
testing, so its observability was not evident in this
practice.
Our data suggest that there may also have been an
issue about the compatibility of the test with the values
of the HCA, who appeared personally uncomfortable
testing for HIV. Indeed, it is unclear whether this staff
member offered any tests throughout the trial period.
This was a source of frustration to the nurse, who had
tried to rectify the situation:
I don’t have any problem with doing [the rapid HIV
test]; the actual doing of the tests is straightforward.
My colleague who should be doing them as well hasn’t
done one. I don’t know. I went through it with her
again a while ago; I don’t know, two or three weeks
back I went through it again with her to remind her
how to do it. And I do it whenever I can, but my
problem is time…. I don’t know if it’s a religious thing,
maybe [explanation of perceived religious views of
colleague]. I don’t know if it’s something to do with
that. But she’s a health care assistant; she’s not a
nurse. That’s a difference as well. – Nurse, practice C
The nurse raises an important point here—that the
rapid HIV test was not merely a technical procedure but
a professional interaction. Technically, it was simple
and straightforward (albeit hard to accommodate if time
was short), but because of its link to a stigmatising ill-
ness, it also required a professional, rather than merely
transactional and task-oriented, relationship with the
patient. Implicitly, the block to adoption may not have
been the HCA’s views per se but the fact that her
role—in this practice, at least—was not professionalised.
HIV remains a stigmatised condition, and the line be-
tween a screening test and a diagnostic test can be fine,
particularly in the case of the test used in the trial,
which may be interpreted by patients as well as pro-
viders (two dots as a reactive result, one dot as a non-
reactive result). It may have been that reluctance to offer
rapid testing relates to the need to provide immediate
feedback regarding test results. Whereas GPs are called
upon to share test reactive results, HCAs and nurses
expressed significant concern about managing reactive
results and patient reactions as well as the interval be-
tween the test and calling upon the GP. This may have
been a factor in the HCA’s reluctance to test. The nurse,
though personally motivated and more professionally
experienced, had only limited opportunity to offer rapid
HIV testing, as most New Patient Health Checks were
performed by the HCA.
It is also significant in the quotation above that the
nurse took personal responsibility for trying to change
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testing. Despite raising the issue with GPs and the prac-
tice manager, no action was apparently taken to explore
or improve this staff member’s low performance on trial
activities. In contrast to the subtle but important in-
volvement of senior clinicians and managerial staff in
practices A and B, the approach of similar staff in prac-
tice C was distinctly ‘hands off ’.
It is noteworthy that the practice nurse made numer-
ous efforts to implement the rapid test, but those efforts
had very limited success in the context described above.
For example, she showed creativity in ‘reinventing’ the
finger-prick aspect of the test. (“As long as I get a decent
drop of blood, just occasionally people don’t bleed ter-
ribly well. I don’t like the finger-pricker they give with it.
I tend to use my ones…. They’re a bit more gentle.”) This
motivation and creativity did not translate into tests ac-
tually performed, however, because most New Patient
Health Checks were done by someone else, and the low
absorptive capacity of the practice meant that the nurse’s
improved method of testing was not effectively shared
with the front-line staff member who had the most op-
portunity to actually do the test.
In sum, practice C was not an innovative practice, nor
was it ready for the specific innovation of rapid HIV
testing. The member of staff on which the intervention
most depended was personally reluctant, and factors
known to help the implementation phase (notably
hands-on input from senior staff ) were absent. In this
environment, the presence of a single, keen and commit-
ted member of staff had only limited impact on the im-
plementation of the intervention.
Practice D (low recruiter): keen doctors but low system
antecedents and negative synergies
Practice D also struggled to implement rapid HIV testing
as a part of the New Patient Health Check. The 557 rapid
tests that were offered during the trial period (of which
43 % were declined) may appear relatively high, but the
size of the practice and consistent registration of new pa-
tients demonstrated a number of missed opportunities for
testing. The pattern of testing over time suggests that the
innovation was never effectively routinised. Rather, pe-
riods with very low rapid testing were interspersed with
periods in which a number of tests were performed within
a short period of time.
On the surface, this low recruitment rate was surpris-
ing. Several of the GPs had a clinical interest in HIV;
HIV serological testing rates were high both before the
trial and during it (696 performed); and a high turnover
of patients ensured high numbers of New Patient Health
Checks.
As one of the largest and most diverse practices in the
borough, practice D comprised 15 GPs, 9 nurses, 3HCAs, 2 practice managers and more than 10 reception-
ists and administrators. Many staff worked part-time.
There was time pressure on many activities, and the
practice was constantly busy. The striking contrast be-
tween the very high HIV serology rates but very low
rapid testing rates may be related to our finding that
there were two distinct work cultures within the prac-
tice. Many of the GPs were highly qualified with some
involved in community-based projects. Others had an
interest in sexual health and regularly offered regularly
offered opportunistic regularly offered opportunistic ser-
ology testing for HIV.
However, the nurses and HCAs appeared to have little
or no involvement in these activities or protected time
to become involved. Knowledge appeared to circulate
well among the doctors, but to a much more limited ex-
tent between the doctors and the other practice staff,
suggesting a problem with absorptive capacity (see the
Discussion section). In general, non-medical staff did
not have academic links. Many worked part-time and
had a very task-oriented attitude toward their work (i.e.,
they came to work, completed what was expected of
them and went home). Some staff described a lack of
harmony in practice relationships as well as a sense of
being personally overstretched. There appeared to be re-
lational tensions between some staff in the practice that
affected the implementation of the study protocol. For
example, HCAs had asked reception staff to hand out
leaflets about the study to patients at the reception desk,
but this did not always happen. Unusually, the research
team assisted in mediating this issue.
Although front-line staff expressed enthusiasm about
providing testing and acknowledged the value of offering
the test, they also viewed involvement in the trial as an
additional task in their already high workload. The doc-
tors in practice D viewed involvement in this trial as im-
portant both for them as professionals and for the
practice population, but they did not appear to discuss
with front-line staff how the innovation could success-
fully be incorporated into an already busy practice. As a
result, opponents of the innovation (‘yet another task’)
outnumbered supporters, and because it was nurses and
HCAs who actually delivered the intervention, these in-
dividuals were more strategically placed to do so. Bursts
of trial activity probably reflected periodic encourage-
ment of front-line staff by GPs concerned to increase
the practice’s performance statistics, but this is very dif-
ferent from routinising the innovation as business as
usual (see the Discussion section).
Although decision making about offering the rapid test
was largely devolved to front-line teams, this was com-
plicated by poor communication and strained relation-
ships, to the extent that front-line staff did not appear
inclined to take responsibility for implementation. There
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because HCAs were often called upon to refocus their
work for short periods to meet particular practice goals.
There was little inter-practice feedback unless it was
prompted by the study team, minimising opportunities
for creating the kind of positive feedback loops that were
evident in practices A and B.
These organisation-level factors significantly oversha-
dowed other, more positive elements of this practice in re-
lation to HIV testing, including the perceived relative
advantage of the rapid test in comparison with the widely
used serological testing, and the compatibility of the test
with the values and goals of the practice. In addition,
whilst most front-line staff found the test simple and
easy to use, one HCA (unusually) reported struggles
with the material aspects of the test and indicated that,
on some occasions, this stopped her from offering test-
ing. Even HCAs who expressed strong enthusiasm for
testing felt they were often unable to offer tests, how-
ever, owing to a lack of time as well as a lack of con-
tinuity in their role.
But because it was coming up to the end of the
financial year and everyone had to tally up QOF
points for diabetes and these and this and that, it took
priority. If people had come in, obviously if there were
new patients, we wouldn’t turn anybody away, but we
were phoning up and pre-booking patients to come in
for their diabs or their foot checks or their blood pres-
sure. And because I’m only now doing 3 days a week, I
literally split sessions between here and (another prac-
tice). I do here three sessions and there three sessions.
So, when I am here, they get me to do loads of ECGs
and different other things, and then when I’m there,
I’m doing things over there that they need doing. –
HCA, practice D
Moreover, despite a number of HIV diagnoses made
using serological testing, no diagnoses were made using
rapid tests, indicating a lack of observability. It is telling
that, whereas doctors in practice B altered their behav-
iour during the trial by sending patients to the nurse for
rapid HIV testing, those in practice D continued to use
serological testing when they suspected possible HIV in
a patient. It appears that the rapid testing was seen as
the province of a different group of staff, not something
that was business as usual. GPs become involved in the
rapid HIV testing algorithm in cases of reactive, indeter-
minate or invalid results, but because none occurred at
practice D, this may have impacted their knowledge and
involvement in trial activities.
In sum, despite much initial enthusiasm, practice D
was impeded by a combination of structural, capacity-
related and cultural factors (most crucially, limited slackresources), along with individual adopter traits and a
weak process of implementation.
Discussion
Summary of findings
This process evaluation of a complex intervention trial
in UK general practice has demonstrated the usefulness
of the diffusion of innovations model in explaining vari-
ation in performance of participating practices. In par-
ticular, five aspects of the model appeared to distinguish
high-performing practices from low-performing ones.
System antecedents for innovation
Larger, more formally organised practices with an appropri-
ate division of roles and slack resources (especially time), as
well as those with strong communication networks and
good managerial relations, were higher recruiters.
System readiness for the innovation
Practices with well-organised New Patient Health
Checks, clear and stable staff roles for these checks, that
had many supporters of rapid HIV testing and that were
able to dedicate time and resources to incorporating the
test smoothly into practice routines were better able to
implement testing.
Adopter characteristics
Staff who perceived the test to be beneficial to patients,
easy to undertake and professionally meaningful under-
took more tests.
The implementation process
Uptake of the intervention was smoother and more
likely when both senior clinicians and managers took a
hands-on approach. If practices devolved decision mak-
ing to front-line teams but did not follow up with sup-
port and feedback, implementation suffered. Dedicated
resources such as time, space and support for implemen-
tation appeared critical.
Reinvention and local customisation
Small adaptations to how, where and by whom the test
was conducted, without losing fidelity of the core com-
ponents, sometimes appeared to make a significant dif-
ference to its acceptance and routinisation within the
practice, though reinvention alone sometimes failed to
overcome wider structural or cultural barriers.
Despite the good fit between individual components of
the model and our case study data, it is important to stress
that our findings also illustrate how these components
may (but do not always) act synergistically and interact
dynamically, allowing strengths in one component to
compensate for limitations in another. Conversely, the
presence of individual elements conducive to innovation
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namic may prevent particular factors from having a posi-
tive influence. This is important because it means that,
whilst all the elements described above are ‘evidence
based’, the way they play out in any particular organisation
will be hard to predict.
Additionally, as acknowledged by Greenhalgh et al. in
their discussion of the diffusion of innovations, greater
consideration of the transferable lessons from cognitive
and social psychology is needed [23]. Models of innovation
diffusion are based largely on a dyadic interaction between
a single adopter and an intervention. Rapid testing in pri-
mary care produces a triad between the provider (the
adopter), the rapid test (the innovation) and the patient.
We found that in many cases the views and actions of
providers depended on their assumptions about patient
feelings and reactions to the offer of a rapid HIV test.
When we did the training, we were sort of told, with
the reactive result, you are to leave the room and get a
doctor. I haven’t had to do that yet, but I don’t know
how that would make the patient feel, if I am just
getting up and walking out…. I mean, I don’t think it
was as abrupt as all that in the training…. I don’t
know how people feel about that, but obviously
something is going on…. Would I just make them more
nervous? – HCA
Unsurprisingly, this provider ‘theory of mind’ regarding
the patient entered the calculus of offering testing and was
a strong aspect of the discussion of the innovation. We
feel this is an underdeveloped aspect of the diffusion of
innovations model which precludes a more nuanced
discussion of the health care consultation, the role of
the patient and the impact of new innovations within it.
Implications for involving organisations in complex
intervention research
Our findings support the conclusion that there is not,
nor can there ever be, a universal implementation model
for complex interventions. Site-specific characteristics
and realities need to be considered. Complex interven-
tions, such as other service-level innovations, cannot be
treated as ‘bolt-ons’, but must instead be carefully inte-
grated with practice systems to become part of business
as usual. This process is known as ‘routinisation’. An or-
ganisational routine is a recurrent, collective, interactive
behaviour pattern implemented (often largely subcon-
sciously) by individual actors through shared knowledge
and practice [40]. Routines are path-dependent; that is,
they are shaped by historical particularities in any given
setting, so there is no such thing as universal best prac-
tice. Whilst routines confer stability in an organisation
by conveying a strong sense of what is ‘business as usual’,they also contain within them the seeds of change be-
cause they depend for their enactment on here-and-now
decisions by individual actors whose creativity can allow
a change to the routine (and hence ‘reinvention’ of the
complex intervention).
Practices who were successful in implementing the
rapid HIV test as part of the trial had routinised the
innovation not merely by assigning its component tasks
to particular staff members but also by encouraging and
rewarding those staff for embedding it in the day-to-day
work of the practice and linking it to other routines.
This crucial distinction between ‘complex intervention
as a set of tasks’ and ‘complex intervention as embedded
routine’ aligns with Denis et al.’s notion of the ‘hard core’
of a complex intervention (the elements that constitute
its ‘fidelity’) and the ‘soft periphery’ which can and must
adapt to accommodate it [16]. In cluster randomised tri-
als, the unit of intervention is large (an entire organisa-
tion, as opposed to individual participants), so poor
uptake of the intervention by one participating unit can
significantly threaten the success of the trial [5].
We cautiously conclude that one way in which re-
searchers might guard against such eventualities would
be to meet with practices prior to recruitment and use
the diffusion of innovation framework to consider the
different ‘soft periphery’ aspects for the proposed inter-
vention. General practices are diverse spaces and vary
widely even within a small geographic locality. Much
may be gained from highlighting the practice’s strengths
and weaknesses in relation to a particular innovation
(‘assessment of implications’ in Fig. 1).
Such an assessment should include, for example, consid-
eration of what is acceptable research ‘fidelity’. Pragmatic
trials are meant to account for the contextual factors im-
plicated in the ‘real-life’ settings where trials are conducted
[6]. In diverse settings such as general practice, greater
consideration of how we define research fidelity may be
required. As discussed by Hawe and Shiell, ‘fidelity de-
fined functionally rather than compositionally’ may be
key [15]. The point is to allow the interventions to be
responsive to their context while still being meaning-
fully evaluated.
Perhaps drafting site-specific mini protocols outlining
how fidelity could be maintained while also accommo-
dating contextual issues could be considered. It may, for
example, mean allocating testing to a particular nurse or
HCA who sees the value in offering testing, finds the
test easy to deliver and enjoys new tasks, or (in busy
practices) extending the time allocated to the New Pa-
tient Health Check, at least in the early stages.
Another, more general way for research teams to guard
against poor uptake of interventions by participating units
is to address the issue of slack resources. Perhaps un-
surprisingly, successful practices in our trial tended to
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rapid testing into their regular practices. The issue here
is that the time taken for one staff member to do the
test is only part of the total time needed to assimilate
the intervention. A practice with limited slack resources
has no alternative but to pull staff from research activ-
ities when deadlines are looming for other key prior-
ities. Specific packages of back-fill or overtime pay
might be key to continuing to deliver at these times of
stress.
Some low-recruiting practices raised concerns about
leadership, staff relations, role distributions and possible
internal hostilities. Such issues make the routinisation of
innovations extremely difficult, and it may be that sensi-
tive exploration of the system antecedents and key success
factors for implementation (Fig. 1) may allow practices
with such ‘risky’ characteristics to be identified in advance
of the trial and offered targeted support (or even excluded
from the sampling frame).
The question of who makes the decision for a practice
to participate in a complex intervention trial is key. As
Everett Rogers observed, the adoption decision for an
innovation can be optional (i.e., everyone can freely de-
cide), collective (i.e., everyone in an organisation or team
must commit) or authoritarian (i.e., imposed by more
powerful members of an organisation on the less power-
ful) [22]. Authoritarian decisions lead to high rates of
initial adoption but also to high levels of front-line re-
sistance, particularly in practices where human resource
issues are already present. Ideally, the decision for an or-
ganisation to join a trial of a complex intervention
should be made collectively and should certainly include
the staff whose job it will be to deliver the intervention.Strengths and limitations of the study
We used an evidence-based model of the diffusion of
health care innovations and applied it to qualitative and
quantitative data from a cluster RCT. The wide variation
in HIV rapid test uptake in the trial enabled testing of
the model, which had not been previously applied to a
trial design. Detailed qualitative and quantitative data
allowed us to examine model aspects and their interplay
through four contrasting case studies. However, the
model was applied retrospectively and in a single trial.
We recommend further new, complex intervention trials
replicating the approach as well as applying the model
prospectively (perhaps with additional degrees of com-
plexity such as behavioural interventions) to extend un-
derstanding of the model’s applicability. We have not
produced a simple checklist for universal application, be-
cause any such checklist would need to be developed to
accommodate both ‘hard core’ and ‘soft periphery’ ele-
ments specific to the intervention being studied.Conclusions
An adaptation of the diffusion of innovations frame-
work was an effective analytical tool for retrospectively
explaining high-recruiting and low-recruiting practices
in a complex intervention research trial. A better un-
derstanding of aspects that may hinder or promote up-
take and routinisation may support the improved
delivery of interventions such as diagnostic screening in
primary care settings. Whether the model will work
prospectively to predict performance (and hence shape
the design of future trials) is unknown.
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